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lease rates for the first time in the literature as a measure of its fundamental value. This question is of particular significance as these are the only
observable market measures of a yield that can be earned from gold. We use unit root and cointegration tests to look for rational speculative
bubbles and Markov Switching Augmented DickeyeFuller tests for periodically bursting bubbles.
ADF and cointegration tests point to a rational speculative bubble. The more theoretically valid Markov Switching ADF test gives mixed
evidence. No bubble is found to be present if we allow the variance to switch between regimes, the gold and its lease rate relationship is instead
characterised by high and low variance periods. Imposing a constant variance gives evidence of a bubble for the 2, 3 and 12 month lease rates,
but no bubble when we use the 1 and 6 month rates as determinants.
Copyright  2013, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim Şirketi. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
JEL classification: C01; F49; G12; G15
Keywords: Gold; Markov; Switching; Bubbles; Lease; Rates
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
In recent years gold has enjoyed a renewed prominence as a
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2013.10.008central banks up to 2010 had a long term policy of selling gold
but in 2010 and 2011 they purchased 77 tonnes and 455 tonnes
respectively. New investment vehicles have emerged to allow
small investors to buy gold with Exchange Traded Funds
(ETFs) buying 368 and 162 tonnes of gold in 2010 and 2011
respectively (GFMS Gold Survey, 2012) though they have
been reducing their holdings in 2013. This has happened to a
backdrop of huge increases in the price of gold in recent years,
rising from just under $300 per fine troy ounce in 2000 to just
over $1900 in mid-2011 before a sharp price fall in 2013 down
to approximately $1200. Fig. 1 below shows the rapidly
increasing volume of open interest in gold futures contracts
since 2000 (Fig. 2).
With both investors and the official sector now increasingly
investing in this asset class again, new nominal highs in the
gold price being reached and followed by large price falls, itting by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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Fig. 1. Open interest in gold futures contracts on COMEX. Source: CFTC,
Commitment of traders.
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gold’s price is justified by a market based fundamental
determinant, that is, by the income that can be earned by
owning it.
We use gold lease rates, the interest that can be earned by
lending physical gold at various maturities, as a way to mea-
sure gold’s true value. Despite these observable market mea-
sures of a cash flow that can be earned from gold existing since
1989, lease rates have never been used to assess whether
bubbles occur in gold. Previous papers in this area have used
convenience yield and real interest rates. We argue that lease
rates are a superior way examine whether bubbles occur in
gold prices for a number of reasons.
We test for rational speculative bubbles by testing for the
existence of stationarity and cointegrating relationships between
the spot price of gold and its lease rates. We also apply more
advanced and theoretically valid tests for periodically bursting
bubbles using Markov-Switching Augmented DickeyeFuller
(MSADF) tests.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2
discusses the literature on the fundamental and macroeco-
nomic drivers of the price of gold. Section 3 gives an overview
of the literature around bubbles, models of bubbles in the priceGOFO12
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Fig. 2. 12 month GOFO and gold leaof gold and evidence on bubbles in the price of gold. Section 4
discusses the methods used to answer the question, Section 5
describes the data used and Section 6 presents results while the
conclusions are in Section 7.
2. What drives the price of gold?2.1. Fundamental microeconomic driversFor any asset we can consider a fundamental microeco-
nomic driver of its value to be the earnable return it can
provide to its owner. All things being equal, a higher return
should increase the asset’s value from a supply and demand
perspective. In the case of gold, a commodity, this causes
some difficulty. Prominent investors such as Warren Buffet
assert that gold has no such earnable return and as such is, in
the limit, valueless (Denning, 2012). This is not quite the case.
There are at least two measures of such a return; the conve-
nience yield and gold lease rates.
Previously gold’s convenience yield has been used to
measure its fundamental value in studies such as Pindyck
(1993), Went, Jirasakuldech, and Emekter (2009) and
Bialkowski, Bohl, Stephan, and Wisniewski (2011). A com-
modity’s convenience yield is the benefit the holder of the
physical commodity receives relative to the owner of a futures
or forward contract on the asset and reflects the markets view
about its future supply (Hull, 2006). It is measured as in
equation (2.1) below:
Ft ¼ Pt$eðrfCYtÞt ð2:1Þ
Where Ft is a futures or forward price at time t, Pt is the spot
price at time t, rf is the risk free rate of interest and CYt is the
convenience yield at time t. Pt can also be replaced with a
futures or forward price of a different maturity to Ft.
Convenience yield is then the rate that allows for no arbi-
trage, as the futures price is equal to the spot price adjusted for
the opportunity cost of investing in physical gold. This yieldL12
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asset such as a bond or a share to compute its present value. It
can be thought of intuitively as the indirect benefits the holder
of a commodity receives such as ease of access for production,
preventing hold up problems and, from a financial asset
perspective for gold, having the metal in your portfolio as a
hedge against market risk or safe haven in a financial crisis as
discussed in Baur and Lucey (2010).
Another, and arguably better, measure of a return that can
be earned by owning gold are gold lease rates. Gold lease rates
have not previously been used to assess gold’s value from the
perspective of fundamental microeconomic drivers. Gold lease
rates are the annualised over the counter interest rates that can
be earned by lending gold over 1, 2, 3, 6 or 12 months. They
are technically referred to as derived lease rates, which is
calculated daily as the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR)
at a given maturity minus the Gold Offer Forward Rate
(GOFO) at that maturity (LBMA, 2008). This can be used by
an owner of gold to earn a cashflow similar to the dividends or
coupon payments that can be earned by owning equities or
bonds.
It is derived in theory as follows: A lends US Dollars to B
at LIBOR and B lends gold to A at GOFO. At the end of the
period both parties return the amount of gold or dollars bor-
rowed plus the interest agreed. The difference is the lease rate
(LBMA, 2008). As GOFO is generally lower than LIBOR
dollars can usually be borrowed more cheaply in this way.
From this we see that the lease rate can be viewed as the
market’s valuation of gold’s worth as collateral for a US
Dollar loan. In reality offsetting loans are not necessary; gold
is simply lent and borrowed at the lease rate. The evolution of
the 12 month GOFO and gold lease rates are shown below.
The main borrowers of gold have been mining companies
and jewellers who would borrow a portion of their expected
mine or jewellery output in the lease market, and sell it to
finance production costs. This provided a cheap source of
dollar finance and also a natural hedge against gold prices as
the leased gold would be returned from their mine production
in ounces of gold or from the sale of jewellery at current
market prices, making gold price changes irrelevant. Hedging
by gold miners fell dramatically in the early 21st century as
gold prices rose steadily but in 2011 net producer hedging
began again (GFMS Gold Survey, 2012).
The payment made at the end of the lease is calculated as:
Lease Ratem  Ounces of Gold  PM Fixing  m
360
ð2:2Þ
Where m is the number of days to maturity and assuming 30
days per month (LBMA, 2008).
This paper posits that gold lease rates are superior to the
convenience yield as a measure of gold’s microeconomic
fundamental value for a number of reasons, both major and
minor.
Lease rates are a directly observable cashflow that can be
earned from owning gold, whereas convenience yield must be
inferred from the difference between the spot and futuresprices of a commodity, or two futures prices of different ma-
turities. This raises the problem that as a measure of gold’s
value convenience yield is derived from two gold prices, the
variables that it seeks to explain (see equation (2.1) above).
The concept of convenience yield is primarily intended for
consumption commodities as it measures the benefits of hav-
ing easy access to a commodity to allow smooth production
and being able to avoid hold up problems. Investment assets
are assumed to have a zero convenience yield; if they do not
arbitrage opportunities present themselves for investors (Hull,
2006). While gold is consumed in electronics and dentistry, it
is primarily held for investment with annual jewellery and
pure investment demand accounting for over 80% of annual
demand between 2000 and 2011 (GFMS Gold Survey, 2012).
This leaves it in a slightly grey area where the convenience
yield applies, but not perfectly.
Gold over the counter market rates, such as lease rates and
GOFO, are rarely discussed in the literature. Levin,
Abhyankar, and Ghosh (1994) provide an arbitrage model
arguing that the lease rate is a proxy for real interest rates.
Levin and Wright (2006) use this finding to argue that the
lease rate, as a proxy for the real interest rate, is the oppor-
tunity cost of holding gold as this is the amount that could
have been earned in a risk free investment in their model of the
gold price. Lucey and O’Connor (2013) look at GOFO’s
ability to forecast future spot prices and find behaviour factors
explain some its failure to do so.
Barone-Adesi, Geman, and Theal (2010) find that lease
rates are a good measure of the convenience yield of owning
gold. This fits with the theory put forward by Levin and
Wright (2006) where the lease rate is composed of the con-
venience yield of gold as well as default risk, given that gold
lease rates are an over the counter transaction and subject to
the risk that one party may default.
Overall, there is a limited amount of analysis of the
fundamental microeconomic drivers of gold. As a conse-
quence, there have been few papers that have examined bub-
bles in the traditional manner, of consistent deviations from
fundamentally justified levels.2.2. Macroeconomic driversAs with any other financial asset, the greater macro-
economy influences gold prices and this area is where the
majority of research on the gold market is concentrated. We
find in the literature that gold relates to other macroeconomic
variables in predictable and economically sensible ways. Thus
Levin and Wright (2006) find that US inflation is the sole
correlate of the gold price over the long term. They argue that
the relationship between gold and US CPI is an artefact of the
cost of gold production.
Christie-David, Chaudhry, and Koch (2000) use intraday
data to assess whether macroeconomics news affects the price
of gold futures. Consumer Price Index (CPI) releases were
found to have a strong effect on returns, which fits with other
research that finds that gold can be a hedge against inflation
such as Ghosh, Levin, Macmillan, and Wright (2004). This is
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diminished by increasing supply through printing, as is the
case of fiat currencies such as the dollar or the euro, and
provides an alternative reason to Levin and Wright (2006).
Kutan and Aksoy (2004) test for the effect of news on the
Turkish Gold Market and find that Turkish CPI does not affect
the US Dollar gold price, further backing up Levin and
Wright’s assertion that US CPI and not world prices are what
matters.
Gold is traded primarily in dollars and the strength of the
dollar (as measured by the trade weighted exchange rate) is
found to be a strong short term determinant by Levin and
Wright (2006) and Kaufman and Winters (1989). A strong
dollar makes gold cheaper for other nations to purchase and
increases their demand. This then drives up the price of gold
explaining their negative relationship, as is found also by Tully
and Lucey (2007) and Sari, Hammoudeh, and Soytas (2010).
However O’Connor and Lucey (2012) show that the trade
weighted value of a number of currencies have negative re-
lationships with the price of gold expressed in that currency. It
implies that when a currency is on average losing value against
all other currencies, it is also likely to be losing value against
gold. This indicates that negative correlation between gold and
the trade weighted value of the dollar may be a spurious one
and points to currency like qualities in gold.
Interest rates also figure as an important explanatory vari-
able. Koutsoyiannis (1983) find a strong link to nominal US
interest rates and Diba and Grossman (1984) find a link to real
interest rates in the US. The underlying economic theory
points to the fact that the opportunity cost of holding gold is
the interest that could have been earned from holding another
currency on deposit. Lawrence (2003) argues against these
points and using quarterly data from 1979 to 2001 finds that
there is no statistically significant link between gold and these
macroeconomic variables.
Baur and Lucey (2010) examine gold’s relationship market
crashes, its safe haven property. They study the relationship
between U.S., U.K. and German stock and bond returns and
gold returns. They find that gold is a hedge and a safe haven
for stocks. However gold only acts as a safe haven for 15 days
after a market crash. Baur and McDermott (2010) extend this
analysis to a more international sample with similar results.
Coudert and Feingold (2011) find a negative or null correlation
between gold and a number of major stock markets indexes.
Deciding which of these factors represent true macroeco-
nomic drivers and which are spurious or speculative factors
represents a real issue, as mentioned above and in Baur and
Glover (2012). Focusing on assessing gold’s true value from
a microeconomic perspective rather than from the macroeco-
nomic standpoint allows us to use an undisputed measure of the
benefit of holding gold, the income that can be earned from it.
3. Rational speculative bubbles in asset prices
What is a bubble? In common parlance we are aware that it
means an asset price which is “too high”, relative to some
fundamental driver, and which must inevitably burst. Moreformally, Gurkaynak (2008:166) defines a rational speculative
bubble (for equities) as being when “investors are willing to
pay more for the stock than they know is justified by the value
of the discounted dividend stream.” They do this in expecta-
tion of being able to sell at a price in the future above the
present value of discounted dividends, making the high price
an equilibrium price. Irrational bubbles in asset prices, where
investors believe the market to be overvalued but do not go
short focus on the difference between investor actions and
beliefs are used in studies such as Vissing-Jorgensen (2003)
but are outside the scope of this research.
Gurkaynak (2008) shows that for a normal asset with an
observable yield it’s fundamental, no arbitrage, value is equal
to the discounted stream of future cash receipts or:
Pt ¼
XN
i¼1
EtðPtþi þCtþiÞ
ð1þ rÞt ð3:1Þ
Where Pt is the value of the asset at time t, Ctþi is the cash
flow derived from owning the asset earned at time t þ i and r is
the risk free rate of interest.
If a rational bubble exists, then the value of the asset is
made up of two components: the fundamental market value,
the discounted value of expected future cash flows, as given by
equation (3.1) and a bubble term, Bt. The true value of the
asset is then given by equation (3.2):
Pt ¼
XN
i¼1
EtðCtþiÞ
ð1þ rÞt þ bt ð3:2Þ
Where bt is the value of bubble component at time t such that:
pt ¼ pt þ bt where Etðbtþ1Þ ¼ ð1þ rÞbt ð3:3Þ
This implies that rational speculative bubbles can exist in
financial markets as long as the rate of growth of the value of
the bubble is equal to its discount factor. The price of the asset
including the bubble is then still an equilibrium value and
investors can rationally invest in it as long as they believe that
the bubble will grow at the discount rate r.3.1. Tests for asset price bubblesThere are a number of approaches used to test empirically
in the literature for the presence of rational speculative bubbles
in asset prices.
Relationship models look at statistical relationships that
exist for the assets in question and their fundamental driver.
Shiller (1980) uses the variance bound tests of the equity
prices to show that their variance is too large to be justified by
fundamentals. Tests for long run relationships between prices
and fundamentals use Unit Roots and Cointegration tests. The
Markov Switching ADF test used in this paper represents an
advanced version of these tests.
Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011) provide another modern
method within this general approach, the sup-ADF. They use
forward recursive right-tailed ADF tests and state that this
method can also be used to anticipate bubbles, making it very
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power of Philips et al.’s (2011) sup-ADF against a number of
alternatives including a version of the sup-ADF test including
a chow test modification, the sup-ADFC. They find that for
randomly starting bubbles their new sup-ADFC test out pre-
forms the sup-ADF in terms of bubble detection. However the
sup-ADF is by far the most powerful in detecting periodically
collapsing bubbles.
Counting models, also known as hazard models, are
different in that they do not compare the time series behaviour
of the determining factors of the value of the asset with its
price. These models include McQueen and Thorley (1994)
non-parametric duration dependence test which they applied
to equity markets.
Explicit models such as Wu (1997) treat bubbles strictly as
deviations from the present value model shown in equation
(3.2), allowing the bubble to be estimated as a time series
variable. The weakness of this approach and relationship
models is common to much finance research. We are really
testing a joint hypothesis; is there a bubble and is our model of
the assets price correct which is similar to the problems found
when testing EMH (Lo, 2007). Any misspecification of the
present value model is included in the bubble component so
that it cannot be shown decisively if a bubble is present or the
model used by the researcher needs correction.3.2. Bubbles in gold prices
3.2.1. Early models
Diba and Grossman (1984) form an equation for the price
of gold based on an investor’s portfolio demand for gold
composed of three parts.
st þ pt ¼ bðEtðptþ1Þ  ptÞ  gEtrtþ1 þ ot ð3:4Þ
Where: pt is the log of the gold price, st is the log of the stock
of gold at t, b is a positive constant, showing the relationship
between the portfolio demand for gold and the real return on
gold, g is a positive constant, showing the relationship be-
tween the portfolio demand for gold and the real return on
other assets, Et($) denotes the rational expectations operator,
rtþ1 represents the rate of return on other assets, ot is other
factors that affect gold’s fundamental value that are not
observable.
The fundamental component (FC) of the value of gold is
given by 3.4 above. It states that the total value of the stock of
gold is based on what is expected to happen to its price in the
future as well as being negatively related to what you can earn
on other assets. Diba and Grossman (1984) use real interest
rates in their model as the return on other assets. Here we will
also include the lease rate on gold as another reason to hold
gold other than expected price changes. Gold lease rate data
begins in 1989 and therefore fell into the ut category of un-
observable variables in their 1984 model.
The other parts of what determines the price of gold are the
Stochastic Bubble Component (SBC), a random variable with
a zero mean whose value falls to zero as time progresses andthe deterministic bubble component (DBC) is what we are
looking for in testing for the presence of bubbles here and if it
is found to be present then we have a rational bubble. These
are shown in equation (3.5) below.
The DBC is a constant, times an eigenvalue raised to a
power greater than 1 [(1 þ b1)t]. This implies that as t in-
creases the DBC increases. The SBC is a constant, times an
eigenvalue raised to a power less than one, so that it decreases
with t [(1 þ b1)ti]. Their equation for the time path of the
price of gold is shown below in equation (3.5).
pt ¼ ð1þ bÞ1
PN
i¼0

1þ b1iEtðuti  grtþ1i  stþiÞ
þc1þ b1t þ
Xt
i¼1

1þ b1tiziFCDBCSBC ð3:5Þ
Where c is a constant determined by an initial condition and zi
is a random variable representing new information with a zero
mean and is uncorrelated with all variables. In the analysis zt is
treated as an unobserved variable.
Diba and Grossman (1984:8) state that “the intuitive
distinction between FC and the bubble components is that, if
the market collectively misunderstands FC, individuals can
gain by contradicting the market, whereas if the market does
not expect a price bubble, individuals who act on the basis of
price forecasts incorporating a bubble will lose”. The bubble
components are rational when the market collectively in-
corporates them in price forecasts.
From this equation the stationarity properties of the process
that generates pt can be investigated for evidence for or against
bubbles. As we cannot observe the DBC we must make in-
ferences about the process that generates the DBC. If the c
equation (3.5) is non-zero it will be mean that the DBC is non-
stationary as it grows at ð1þ b1Þj, regardless of how many
times it is differenced (Gurkaynak, 2008). If we find that the
process generating the FC components is stationary, pt would
also be stationary if no bubble is present.
The number of times it is necessary to difference the de-
terminants of gold’s value to make them stationary would then
be the number of times it is necessary to make pt stationary, if
pt is the fundamental value and is determined by its lease rate
and leasing cashflows. As Evans (1991) argues if the price
series of an asset is not more explosive than its fundamental
determinant then it can be said that no bubble is present, as the
fundamental component is what gives us the price series.
Diba and Grossman (1988) test for a bubble in the price
of shares using the idea that if two series are found to be
I(1) from both sets of ideas above, and their linear combi-
nation cointegrates, then there is an equilibrium relationship
between them, implying that no bubbles exist. They argue
that it is unlikely that an unobserved fundamental will be
I(2), meaning that failing to reject a cointegrating rela-
tionship for variables is proof of a fundamentally deter-
mined price. Rejection however may not prove that a bubble
exists due to differing power and size properties of coin-
tegration tests.
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Evans (1991) points out that these tests are only applicable
for bubbles that continue to grow in pt from t ¼ 0 as the c
component is not time varying and must be present from the
start in order to enter the series. They do not have any ability
to detect periodically bursting bubbles. Evans also assumes
that a bubble cannot be negative, but unlike earlier work
bubbles in this model can now collapse to a low but positive
value. The bubble can then be in one of two different states at
any time.
Btþ1 ¼ ð1þ rÞBtUtþ1if Bt  a 3:7a
Btþ1 ¼ ½

vþp1ð1þ rÞqtþ1
 Btð1þ rÞ1
Utþ1 if Bt >a
3:7b
Where d and a are positive parameters such that
0 < d < (1 þ r)a and Utþ1is an exogenous identically and
independently distributed (iid) random variable with
S(Utþ1) ¼ 1. q is an exogenous and Independently identically
distributed (IID) Bernoulli process independent of Ut which
takes on a value of 1 with a probability of p and a value of
0 with a probability of 1p.
Thinking of bubbles in this way increases our ability to
identify them, as under Diba and Grossman (1988) model the
bubble would need to be present over the period being exam-
ined. Evans (1991) points out that it is more likely that bubbles
appear and disappear, making it more likely that the process
will appear stationary but in reality still contain speculative
bubbles. Testing for this class of bubbles represents a more
realistic test of what we would expect to see in reality.
Hall, Psaradakis, and Sola (1999) use simulation and an
empirical example to put Evans (1991) idea into practise using
a Markov Switching Augmented DickeyeFuller (MSADF)
following Hamilton’s (1989) method. This method has been
applied to bubble detection as in Liu, Margaritis, and Wang
(2012) and in other contexts such as studying real exchange
rate nonlinearities in Kruse, Fro¨mmel, Menkhoff, and
Sibbertsen (2012).
3.2.3. Evidence for bubbles in the price of gold
Diba and Grossman (1984) find that the price of gold is
entirely based on market fundamentals using conventional unit
root and cointegration tests with real interest rates on com-
mercial paper as the measure of gold opportunity cost. Evans
(1991), as previously discussed, criticised these results on the
basis that they do not detect periodically bursting bubbles.
A number of researchers have used gold’s CY to find a true
fundamental value for gold, in the same way as is normal for
storable consumption commodities, such as oil or copper.
Pindyck (1993) assumes that the fundamental value of a
commodity is the present value of expected future payoffs. A
gold price bubble is found between 1975 and 1990, but when it
occurs cannot be specified. Went et al. (2009) find evidence of
a bubble using a duration dependence test on the monthly
interest-adjusted basis, a measure of the potential excess
returns earned on commodities through their CY. Bialkowskiet al. (2011) find the deviations of gold price from its funda-
mental value based on a CY approach and they see no evi-
dence of a bubble in the period between 1978 and 2010.
Bertus and Stanhouse (2001) use dynamic factor analysis to
look for bubbles in the quarterly futures price of gold. They
build an explicitmodel of the supply and demand for gold, based
on the macroeconomic drivers discussed in Section 2.2, to
derive a fundamental price and use this to estimate a time series
for the bubble component in the price. The bubble component is
however found to be insignificant so they conclude that no
bubble is present. Bialkowski, Bohl, Stephan, and Wisniewski
(2012) build an approximation of gold’s fundamental value
based on a similar set of macroeconomic drivers and apply a
Markov-Switching ADF test. They find no evidence of a bubble
when the European sovereign debt crisis is accounted for. This
however points to a weakness of this approach, over-
specification. If enough explanatory variables are included not
bubble finding is not much of a surprise. Baur andGlover (2012)
also argue that some of the variables used in Bialkowski et al.
(2012) do not represent fundamental drivers but factors that
attract speculative investors, which would cause the bubble.
Baur and Glover (2012) apply Phillips et al. (2011) sup-
ADF tests (forward recursive ADF tests) for explosive price
behaviour but do make any assumptions about the funda-
mental determinant of the value of gold. They conclude that
the gold price has been in a bubble between 2002 and 2012,
except in 2008e9 during the sub-prime mortgage crisis due to
its explosive price behaviour.
4. Methodology4.1. Unit roots and cointegrationDiba and Grossman (1984) test for unit roots in gold prices
by looking at the Auto Correlation Function of the gold price
and real interest rates, as well as their 1st and 2nd differences.
Diba and Grossman (1988) use Augmented DickeyeFuller
(ADF) tests to provide a more rigorous way of looking for unit
roots in the variables, as employed by and shown in equation
(4.1) below.
Dyt ¼ pyt1 þ
Xp
j¼1
bjytj þ εj 4:1
Where y is the asset price and Dyt ¼ yt  yt1.
Diba and Grossman (1988) also test for cointegrating re-
lationships between gold and its fundamental determinants.
Following the earlier ADF tests they estimate:
Dvt ¼ pvt1 þ
Xk
j¼1
bjDvt1 þ εj 4:2
where vt are the residuals from the regression of asset prices on
the relevant fundamental determinant. We run these as pre-
liminary tests.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Fixing Lease rate
AM PM 1 month 2 month 3 month 6 month 12 month
Observations 6283 6283 6283 4075 6283 6283 6283
Mean 576.62 576.21 0.6731 0.4343 0.7706 0.8806 1.0756
Standard Deviation 410.04 409.62 0.8502 0.7342 0.8292 0.7888 0.7708
Skewedness 1.6719 1.6730 1.9708 2.9841 1.6595 1.3116 0.8330
Kurtosis 1.5878 1.5923 7.5074 15.978 5.5460 3.0566 1.2623
Source: LBMA website.
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a Markov Switching ADF framework, as discussed in
Hamilton (1989, 1990). This provides a development of the
ADF tests described above to take into account the critique of
Evans (1991), that traditional unit root and cointegration tests
do not account for periodically collapsing bubbles.
We adjust equation (4.1) as in Hall et al. (1999) so that it is
now time varying, changing with an unobserved indicator st,
the stochastic regime variable, which takes on a value of 0 or 1
so that:
Dy¼ pst þFstyt1 þ
Xk
i¼1
bst;iDytj þ s2stεt 4:3
Where pst ¼ p0 þ stðp1  p0Þ, Fst ¼ F0 þ stðF1  F0Þ, bst;i
¼ b0;i þ stðb1;i  b1;iÞ and s2st ¼ s20 þ stðs21  s20Þ. εst is nor-
mally distributed and k is the lag order of the model. We as-
sume that the probability that the process is in a particular
regime at time t depends only upon the probability of which
regime the process was in at time t  1, and not on earlier
periods. We therefore model this random sequence to a ho-
mogenous Markov chain with transition probabilities as
defined as below, allowing the data to determine whether or
not we are in a particular state:Table 2
Maximum likelihood estimates: Residuals of PM fixing and lease rates:
MSADF-RV.
1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 6 Month 12 Month
F1 0.0104
[1.742]
0.0001
[0.010]
0.0046
[0.981]
0.005
[0.891]
0.0053
[1.003]
Variance 1 0.6215*** 0.6436*** 0.4814*** 0.4503*** 0.3460***
F2 0.0045***
[4.609]
0.0061***
[5.579]
0.003***
[5.695]
0.002***
[3.956]
0.0014
[2.345]
Variance 2 0.1073*** 0.0952*** 0.1090*** 0.1028*** 0.0996***
P12 0.2883*** 0.2636*** 0.2550*** 0.2581*** 0.3424***
P21 0.0694*** 0.0464*** 0.0579*** 0.0472*** 0.0456***
Note: *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, t-stats
are given below in parentheses.Prðst ¼ 1jst1 ¼ 1Þ ¼ p
Prðst ¼ 0jst1 ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1 p
Prðst ¼ 1jst1 ¼ 0Þ ¼ q
Prðst ¼ 0jst1 ¼ 0Þ ¼ 1 q
4:4
From this we will also find the probability that the series is
in regime 1 at any time ( p) or in regime 2 (1  p), the
transition probabilities.
We estimate the parameters using maximum likelihood
procedures as in Hall et al. (1999) to test the null hypothesis of
a bubble in either regime (i.e. that Fst > 0, a right tailed test
for explosiveness) against the alternative of a regime which is
either stationary or has a unit root. If Fst > 0 in any state we
can say that a bubble is present in the data for that state. The
process gives inferences about the probability of being in a
particular state ½Prðst ¼ 1IIt;wÞ, where It ¼ ( y1,.,yt) and
w ¼ (p1, p2, F1, F2, b0;1 .b0;k , b1;1 .b1;k)], the filter
probabilities that we are in state 1 at any time. These allow us
to make inferences about which of the unobserved regimes we
are in at any time as in Hamilton (1989) and Hall et al. (1999).
We use the BroydeneFletchereGoldfarbeShanno (BFGS)
algorithm following Shi (2012) who finds this outperforms the
alternative expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm in esti-
mating this type of model.
We can also allow the variance in each regime to switch
between the two states, as in Brooks and Persand (2001) or
remain constant as in Shi (2012). Shi (2012) argues that
imposing a constant variance can improve the power of theTable 3
Maximum likelihood estimates: residuals of PM fixing and lease rates:
MSADF-CV.
PM fixing and lease rates: daily data
1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 6 Month 12 Month
F1 0.007
[0.258]
0.225***
[8.687]
0.256***
[8.807]
0.0458
[1.383]
0.1071*
[2.196]
F2 0.004***
[5.646]
0.010***
[0.4.893]
0.005***
[6.607]
0.0046***
[5.293]
-0.0032***
[3.999]
P12 0.925*** 0.775*** 0.814*** 0.639*** 0.718***
P21 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.010***
Note: *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, t-stats
are given below in parentheses.
Fig. 3. The probability of being in regime 1 at t, MSADF-CV.
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when the differences between the residual variance of the
different regimes is large. It also makes the results more robust
to model misspecification. We carry out both a constant
variance (MSADF-CV) and regime switching variance ADF
(MSADF-RV) test to assess the sensitivity of our results tothese factors but more emphasis is put on the MSADF-CV due
to its increased power.
Nelson, Zivot, and Piger (2001) chose their lag length using
the backward lag-length selection procedure as found in
Campbell and Perron (1991) with the lag length, k, set equal to
a maximum of the lower integer bound of T1/3 as proposed in
6 Month 
12 Month 
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
0.00
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0.50
0.75
1.00
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
2000
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
2000
Fig. 3. (continued).
1 These are available from the authors on request.
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SCB in formations criteria. Here we apply the three methods
and when they disagree, we test all suggested models only
reporting the most parsimonious model if the results are
qualitatively the same.
Camacho (2011) points out that the distribution of the t-
statistic used to test the null is nonstandard. We follow Hall
et al. (1999) by bootstrapping the model under the null hy-
pothesis in order to calculate the simulated critical values,
using the estimates of the model parameters from this real-
isation of yt. The number of bootstrap replications is 50,000.
The steps of the estimating procedure are given in Camacho
(2011).
5. Data
Table 1 below shows the descriptive statistics for the daily
data used in this study. The AM and PM fixings are daily over
the counter London spot prices. Lucey, Larkin, and O’Connor
(2013) analyse whether the price of gold is set through the
Fixings in London or the futures market in New York, finding
that both play a dominant role at different times. All data is
available from 17th of July 1989 up to the 31st of July 2013
for all variables except the 2 month lease rate which begins onthe 2nd of January 1998. The lease rates are all annualised
figures. Data is available from the London Bullion Market
Association (LBMA) website.6. Results6.1. Preliminary tests: traditional ADF and
cointegration testsTheAM, PMFixings and lease rates are I(1) in levels and I(0)
in 1st differences based on ADF tests. No cointegrating re-
lationships were found to exist between any of the I(1) pairs
using traditional cointegration tests. The lack of a cointegrating
relationship between the variables implies that a long run
equilibrium relationship may not exist between gold prices and
gold lease rates, so that rational speculative bubbles occur in the
price of gold. However as these methods’ ability to detect
bubbles is very poor in the presence of periodically bursting
bubbles, as discussed in Section 4.2, the results are not reported
here1 and are discussed purely as a preliminary to the results of
test for periodically collapsing bubbles in the next section.
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for periodically bursting bubblesTable 4
Cross-correlation matrix: probabilities of being in regime 1, for all maturities
MSADF-CV.
1 month 2 month 3 month 6 month 12 month
1 Month 1 e e e
2 Month 0.556 1 e e e
3 Month 0.491 0.727 1 e e
6 Month 0.500 0.556 0.565 1 e
12 Month 0.399 0.480 0.534 0.644 1In Tables 2 and 3 below the results of both the MSADF-RV
and MSADF-CV models derived from equation (4.3) are
shown, for the residuals of the PM Fixing and each lease rate
maturity. The results for the AM fixings are not shown as they
are qualitatively identical. F1 andF2 are the means of regime 1
and 2 respectively, Variance 1 and Variance 2 are the regimes
respective variances (where applicable) and P12 and P21 are the
probability of switching from regime 1 to regime 2 and vice
versa. All estimations include a constant term and the appro-
priate number of lags as determined from the procedures dis-
cussed in Section 4.2 but the coefficients are not reported here.
We can see in Table 2 that when we allow the variance to
differ across regimes (MSADF-RV) two regimes exist for all
lease rate maturities. However regardless of the lease rate
maturity no bubble is found to be present. Based on a right
tailed test for explosiveness with a null of Fst > 0 all equations
fail to find a bubble. Regime 1 is stationary, i.e. F1 is not
significantly different from zero, while regime 2 has a unit
root, but it is not explosive.
We find that the two regimes are characterised not by one
having a bubble but by sizeably different variances. Regime 1
has the lower variance by a multiple of between approximately
3 and 6 times depending on which maturity of lease rate used
as the fundamental determinant in the equation. The residuals
of the relationships between the gold price and measures of the
benefit of holding gold are then characterised by periods of
stability (regime 1) and increased volatility (regime 2), that is
times when lease rates are not as powerful an explanatory
variable for gold prices.
The results of the estimations when we restrict the variance
to be the same in both regimes (MSADF-CV) are shown in
Table 3. This approach finds in favour of a bubble in the gold
price when the 2, 3 and 12 month lease rates are used as the
fundamental determinant of gold prices. F1 is significantly
greater than 0 at the 1% level for 2 and 3 month maturity and
at 10% for 12 months, indicating an explosive unit root and so
a periodically collapsing bubble in the gold price. For 1 and 6
month maturities no bubble is found as regime 1 is stationary
and regime 2 is not explosive. The probability of switching
from the bubble regime to regime 2 is very high and once in
regime 2, it switches much more infrequently. As these results
are more robust, based on Shi’s (2012) work, we focus on
these below.
Fig. 3 plots the inferred filter probabilities of being in
regime 1 at any given time based on the information available
at that time, as in Hamilton (1989), for all maturities under the
MSADF-CV estimations. When the probability is less than 0.5
we are in regime 1 and when greater than 0.5 we can say that
we are probably in regime 2. From this we can see a long
period of stability in the mid 2000’s where the gold price
was fundamentally justified based on the 2 and 3 month lease
rates. The relationship between gold prices and lease rates
frequently switches into a bubble over the rest of the sample
but quickly moves out of it each time.Table 4 shows the cross-correlation matrices for the filter
probabilities for all lease rates based on the MSADF-CV. We
see the highest correlation between the 2 and 3 month esti-
mations where we find a bubble with the highest degree of
confidence.7. Conclusions
In attempting to answer whether bubbles occur in the price
of gold we use gold lease rates as a measure of gold’s
fundamental value for the first time in the literature, testing for
rational speculative bubbles and periodically bursting bubbles
using two types of regime switching models.
The traditional unit root and cointegration for rational
bubbles give mixed evidence, but indicate the possibility of a
rational speculative bubble in the price of gold. However these
tests have a poor ability to deal with periodically bursting
bubbles as explained by Evans (1991). We therefore move
onto using Markov Switching ADF tests for cointegration to
allow the assumption of a single long run relationship to be
relaxed. Two different regimes are allowed to exist to assess
whether bubbles form and then burst over time.
We run these tests to allow for the variance to be a switch
between the two regimes and holding it constant, as rec-
ommended by Shi (2012). Allowing the variance to switch
results in no bubble being found. Instead the two regimes are
characterised by a high and low variance; this indicates that
in the high variance regime the lease rates’ power as
explanatory variables decreases significantly. When we
restrict the variance between regimes we do find some evi-
dence of a bubble using the 2, 3 and 12 month lease rates. A
stable period in the mid-2000’s shows the gold price as
fundamentally determined by its lease rates but at other
times bubble phases occur frequently if only for short pe-
riods. As the constant variance model is more powerful and
robust we must can conclude that there is some evidence of
bubbles in gold prices.
Further research in applying lease rates to gold prices as a
fundamental determinant to assess whether bubbles occur are
necessary to get a clearer picture, asking the question using
different approaches such as Philips et al.’s (2011) sup-ADF
test or McQueen and Thorley (1994) non-parametric dura-
tion dependence test for bubbles. This paper’s use of a market
based measure of gold’s economic benefit however does pro-
vide new and theoretically strong evidence that gold has been
through some bubble phases at certain times over the last 20
years.
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